Systemic consequences of Brexit

SUERF conference. The slides can be downloaded here. The main conclusions are:

"> SUERF conference. The slides can be downloaded here. The main conclusions are:

ARM on AWS for R 15 June 2020
Low vol strategies 8 May 2020
Of Julia and R 8 May 2020
How to manipulate risk forecasts 101 30 April 2020
The five principles of correct riskometer use 27 April 2020
The problem with Backtesting 25 April 2020
The magic of riskometers 24 April 2020
Risk and scientific socialism 23 April 2020
Financial crises and epidemics 19 April 2020
Hayek and Corona 17 April 2020
Hayek et Corona 17 April 2020
Ignoring the Corona analysis 15 April 2020
The coronavirus crisis is no 2008 26 March 2020
Artificial intelligence as a central banker 6 March 2020
Systemic consequences of outsourcing to the cloud 2 December 2019
The dissonance of the short and long term 12 August 2019
Central banks and reputation risk 6 August 2019
The Brexit culture war 5 May 2019
All about BoB — The Bank of England Bot 29 April 2019
My tiny, tiny contribution to Apple's fall in profits 6 January 2019
The 2018 market in a 250 year context 1 January 2019
Short and long-term risk 3 December 2018
Perceived and actual risk 2 December 2018
Cryptocurrencies: Financial stability and fairness 9 November 2018
The October 2018 stock market in a historical context 1 November 2018
The hierarchy of financial policies 12 September 2018
Which numerical computing language is best: Julia, MATLAB, Python or R? 9 July 2018
Cryptocurrencies 26 June 2018
What are risk models good for? 3 June 2018
The McNamara fallacy in financial policymaking 1 June 2018
VIX, CISS and all the political uncertainty 20 May 2018
Here be dragons 30 March 2018
Low risk as a predictor of financial crises 26 March 2018
Cryptocurrencies don't make sense 13 February 2018
Yesterday's mini crash in a historical context 6 February 2018
Artificial intelligence and the stability of markets 15 November 2017
European bank-sovereign doom loop 30 September 2017
Do the new financial regulations favour the largest banks? 27 September 2017
The ECB Systemic Risk Indicator 24 September 2017
Finance is not engineering 22 September 2017
University of Iceland seminar 14 June 2017
Brexit and systemic risk 31 May 2017
Should macroprudential policy target real estate prices? 12 May 2017
Learning from history at LQG 13 April 2017
Is Julia ready for prime time? 12 March 2017
With capital controls gone, Iceland must prioritise investing abroad 12 March 2017
Competing Brexit visions 25 February 2017
Systemic consequences of Brexit 23 February 2017
Why macropru can end up being procyclical 15 December 2016
The fatal flaw in macropru: It ignores political risk 8 December 2016
Why it doesn't make sense to hold bonds 27 June 2016
On the financial market consequences of Brexit 24 June 2016
Cyber risk as systemic risk 10 June 2016
Big Banks' Risk Does Not Compute 24 May 2016
Interview on þjóðbraut on Hringbraut 21 May 2016
Farewell CoCos 26 April 2016
Will Brexit give us the 1950s or Hong Kong? 18 April 2016
Of Brexit and regulations 16 April 2016
IMF and Iceland 12 April 2016
Stability in Iceland 7 April 2016
Everybody right, everybody wrong: Plural rationalities in macroprudential regulation 18 March 2016
Of tail risk 12 March 2016
Models and regulations and the political leadership 26 February 2016
Why do we rely so much on models when we know they can't be trusted? 25 February 2016
Does a true model exist and does it matter? 25 February 2016
The point of central banks 25 January 2016
The macro-micro conflict 20 October 2015
Volatility, financial crises and Minsky's hypothesis 2 October 2015
Impact of the recent market turmoil on risk measures 28 August 2015
Iceland, Greece and political hectoring 13 August 2015
A proposed research and policy agenda for systemic risk 7 August 2015
Are asset managers systemically important? 5 August 2015
Objective function of macro-prudential regulations 24 July 2015
Risky business: Finding the balance between financial stability and risk 24 July 2015
Regulators could be responsible for next financial crash 21 July 2015
How Iceland is falling behind. On Sprengisandur 12 July 2015
Greece on Sprengisandur 12 July 2015
Why Iceland can now remove capital controls 11 June 2015
Market moves that are supposed to happen every half-decade keep happening 14 May 2015
Capital controls 12 May 2015
What do ES and VaR say about the tails 25 April 2015
Why risk is hard to measure 25 April 2015
Post-Crisis banking regulation: Evolution of economic thinking as it happened on Vox 2 March 2015
The Danish FX event 24 February 2015
On the Swiss FX shock 24 February 2015
Europe's proposed capital markets union 23 February 2015
What the Swiss FX shock says about risk models 18 January 2015
Model risk: Risk measures when models may be wrong 8 June 2014
The new market-risk regulations 28 November 2013
Solvency II: Three principles to respect 21 October 2013
Political challenges of the macroprudential agenda 6 September 2013
Iceland's post-Crisis economy: A myth or a miracle? 21 May 2013
The capital controls in Cyprus and the Icelandic experience 28 March 2013
Towards a more procyclical financial system 6 March 2013
Europe's pre-Eurozone debt crisis: Faroe Islands in the 1990s 11 September 2012
Countercyclical regulation in Solvency II: Merits and flaws 23 June 2012
The Greek crisis: When political desire triumphs economic reality 2 March 2012
Iceland and the IMF: Why the capital controls are entirely wrong 14 November 2011
Iceland: Was the IMF programme successful? 27 October 2011
How not to resolve a banking crisis: Learning from Iceland's mistakes 26 October 2011
Capital, politics and bank weaknesses 27 June 2011
The appropriate use of risk models: Part II 17 June 2011
The appropriate use of risk models: Part I 16 June 2011
Lessons from the Icesave rejection 27 April 2011
A prudential regulatory issue at the heart of Solvency II 31 March 2011
Valuing insurers' liabilities during crises: What EU policymakers should not do 18 March 2011
Risk and crises: How the models failed and are failing 18 February 2011
The saga of Icesave: A new CEPR Policy Insight 26 January 2010
Iceland applies for EU membership, the outcome is uncertain 21 July 2009
Bonus incensed 25 May 2009
Not so fast! There's no reason to regulate everything 25 March 2009
Modelling financial turmoil through endogenous risk 11 March 2009
Financial regulation built on sand: The myth of the riskometer 1 March 2009
Government failures in Iceland: Entranced by banking 9 February 2009
How bad could the crisis get? Lessons from Iceland 12 November 2008
Regulation and financial models: Complexity kills 29 September 2008
Blame the models 8 May 2008

Systemic consequences of Brexit

23 February 2017

I got to present on the systemic risk consequences of Brexit in a SUERF conference. The slides can be downloaded here. The main conclusions are:

Systemic consequences of Brexit possible but unlikely
Systemic crises happen when we suddenly question existing assumptions for how the world works
It is hard to identify what will go wrong, in advance
Soft Brexit may increase systemic risk
Brexit may result in lower systemic risk if the regulatory landscape fragments and globalism is reduced
Hard Brexit and a tough EU stand in the negotiations may lower systemic risk
Unknown unknowns are the threat
They may lurk in the legal plumbing and equivalence